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State policies vary widely on paying friends and family rather than home care
agencies to care for the elderly. We explore two state programs that exemplify
different payment options: Michigan, which pays clients’ informal caregivers, and
Illinois, which generally pays agencies to provide services. We ask how different
payment policies affect clients, specifically exploring program structure (division
of labor and bases for need determination) and financing incentives created by
Medicaid (centralization, means testing, and quality assurance). These factors
shape provider and client preferences, well-being, and assessment of care quality.
Comparatively, Illinois’s approach favors professionalism, high cost/quality,
documentation, and an orientation toward medical and physical needs. It has
experienced high worker turnover and less regard for caregiver-client relationships.
Michigan’s approach favors informality, casual accountability, long-term stability
of helping relationships, and respect for client preferences and autonomy. Both
approaches offer important client benefits, but state precedents and incentives to
administering agencies have shaped their overall directions. The recent rapid
growth of the home care industry in Illinois could proscribe a fuller range of
provider options. We recommend greater flexibility in considering states’ payment.
Medicaid coverage of home care services has grown dramatically
since 1982, when waivers for home- and community-based care (under
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Section 2176) first permitted states to use federal matching funds to
divert care from institutions (Weissert, 1986). States’choices to contract
with formal agencies, as opposed to informal care providers, particularly
family members and friends, present an interesting basis on which to
analyze comparatively their Medicaid home care services.
A number of recent studies have explored state programs to pay
informal caregivers, generally friends and relatives. Burwell (1986)
examined 13 such state programs and found variance in size, funding
source, and relationship to other programs. Linsk, Keigher, Osterbusch,
and Simon-Rusinowitz (in press) found key differences in provisions for
payments to family members, including outright prohibition against
relatives receiving payment, provision of a &dquo;family or attendant
allowance,&dquo; and reliance on home care agency employees with de facto
exclusion of informal caregivers (family or friends) from employment or
eligibility for reimbursement. Despite the prevalence of agency-provided
care in the United States, 32 of the 45 states responding reported having
at least some provision for paying family members to care for an elderly
dependent member.
Biegel (1986) and associates identified 23 states providing significant
economic incentives (both tax incentives and direct payment programs)
to family caregivers. Observing great variation in eligibility require-
ments, level of benefits, and payments, as well as program administration
and structure, he notes that &dquo;direct payment programs tend to be
targeted at the lower income, high risk elderly to a greater degree than
tax benefit programs&dquo; (p. 48). A related analysis by Osterbusch,
Keigher, Miller, and Linsk (1987) frames reimbursement of family care,
which is largely provided by women, as an issue of gender justice. These
studies lack thorough analysis of individual state programs and thus
reveal little about how different payment policies affect older clients.
Our study does this in examining only two quite similar states that take
contrasting approaches to informal care.
Programs in Michigan and Illinois are ideal for thorough analysis.
Both are large, industrial states somewhat similar in size, ethnic
composition, and extent of urbanization. The key programs providing
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home care to the elderly in Michigan are based on payment of informal
caregivers, while in Illinois this option is only occasionally exercised.
The Illinois Community Care Program, operated by the state’s
Department on Aging (IDOA), represents a prototypic agency-based
model reliant on agencies to determine eligibility and provide direct
services. The Michigan Adult Home Help program, operated by the
state welfare agency, the Department of Social Services (DSS),
represents a prototypic client-based model in that it relies on the client to
suggest appropriate caregivers who then provide the direct service. Each
is described below.
Michigan’s Home Help program relies heavily on family and friends
as the paid providers of choice and closely resembles a family-, or
attendant-, allowance model such as that of the Veteran’s Administra-
tion. The program provides a cash transfer to the client, who pays the
caregiver of his or her own choice, who may be a relative. Illinois
contracts community care services to outside agencies and neither
prohibits nor encourages these agencies regarding the hiring of relatives.
The contract agencies are permitted to make their own policies. This
almost always results in some de facto exclusion of informal providers
because of agencies’ preferences for full-time, flexible employees.
While Michigan also provides personal care service, both states
provide homemaker and chore or housekeeping services. Both programs
pay for similar assistance with activities of daily living to deter or
preclude nursing home placement. The main difference is in who receives
payment and in who selects and pays the caregiver.
Two dimensions of state policy choice appear to create the incentives
that have resulted in program divergence: the states’ program structure
and the means of financing (Linsk, Keigher et al., in press). Program
structure includes reliance on formal contract agencies to provide services
to Illinois clients and reliance on state employees to contract with informal
caregivers in Michigan. Financing includes each state’s use of Medicaid
and the incentives created by the home- and community-based care waiv-
ers. This study contrasts how the incentives created by structure and
financing appear to differentially affect providers’ and clients’ prefer-
ences, well-being, and assessment of care quality.
Methods and Findings
We interviewed key state officials, case managers, and contract
agency staff from both states to explore the procedures and values
operating in each state’s program. We gathered program performance,
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financing, and expenditure data from published agency reports. We
reviewed a survey of Illinois home care agencies (Linsk, Osterbusch,
Simon-Rusinowitz, & Keigher, in press) and conducted exploratory
interviews with a small number of clients and their caregivers in
Michigan. We analyzed program data to delineate the structure and
financing of each state program and the key effects clients felt. The
interview and survey findings provide salient statements that highlight
respondents’ policy perspectives.
The main features found in each state’s basic home care program are
summarized in Table 1. The salient contrasting elements include how
the program developed, the structure of service delivery, mechanisms
for financing, and impacts on clients.
Program Origins and Context
Long-term care services in Michigan have been characterized by a
gradual and steady growth of home care services over a long period,
while Illinois has experienced more recent and rapid growth. In the past
decade Michigan has constrained nursing home construction and use by
Medicaid recipients while it gradually developed a broad array of
supervised living arrangements (alternatives to nursing homes). In 1976
Michigan had 47.7 nursing home beds per 1,000 elderly, while Illinois
had 50.0 (Vladeck, 1980), only very slightly more; but by 1981 the
Michigan rate was 49.3, while in Illinois it was 68.3 (Aging Health Policy
Center nursing home supply data for 1985 in Harrington, Newcomer, &
Estes et al., 1985). Michigan imposed tight controls on nursing home
construction through certificates of need. Nursing home use by
Medicaid patients declined from 32,000 in 1975 to 29,000 in 1985.
Michigan also made extensive use of board-and-care homes and adult
foster care homes, expanding adult foster care beds from 13,000 to
18,500 in this period.
The most substantial growth, however, occurred in the two home-
based care programs of the Department of Social Services (DSS), Adult
Home Help and Medicaid Home Health. Home Help provides personal
care and chore housekeeping services, while Home Health, in the
Medicaid budget, provides nursing care services.
Between 1975 and 1985, Home Help grew from 9,800 to 22,700
clients, and Home Health grew from 2,810 to 7,925 clients. Clients over
age 60 compose a growing share of Home Help-currently 72% of the
program’s 22,700 users, up from 67.2% just four years before (Michigan
Department of Social Services, 1985; Nye, 1982). About half of the
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Table 1. Program and Policy Analysis Model
7,925 Home Health users are over age 60. Deinstitutionalization of the
mentally ill, which also occurred during this period, was facilitated by a
shift of Department of Mental Health funding and responsibility to
local mental health centers.
In Michigan the private home health care industry is less developed
than in Illinois, at least partly because, in providing directly for the
dependent population through the Home Help program and adult
foster care, Michigan has created few market incentives for private
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nursing home corporations or home health agencies to expand or move
into the state. According to information from the DSS Medical Services
Administration Office of Policy, total institutional beds (nursing homes
and state institutions) increased by only 10.2% from 1975 to 1985 (from
44,000 to 48,513), while the elderly population grew by 22%. Over time
state alternatives to nursing homes have facilitated a significant
diversion of the growing poor elderly population from more expensive
nursing home settings, while reimbursement for alternatives is received
generally by individual informal caregivers and small homes.
Illinois’s commitment to community-based long-term care was more
recent and dramatic. With the closure of three state psychiatric
institutions in 1982, large numbers of disabled clients were transferred
to community nursing homes, reducing access to nursing homes for
other Medicaid patients and necessitating development of less expensive
alternatives for the poor elderly in the community. Adult foster care,
which cannot be developed quickly, remains underdeveloped.
To absorb this pressure, Illinois dramatically expanded its home care
service in the early 1980s. Community Care Program use expanded
from 14,200 clients in FY84 to 22,085 served in FY86. The home care
industry responded to this stimulus with hundreds of home care
agencies bidding for contracts to implement state-funded community
services. The state delivery system’s turn to contract agencies was
followed by very rapid growth of the home care industry.
Structure of Service Delivery
and Payment System
Dispersion of Care Planning
The Illinois Community Care Program (CCP) contracts with local
agencies to serve as Case Coordination Units (CCUs) for a given region
for a given period. The CCU assesses the client, authorizes hours of care
and payment, and monitors the provision of care. The CCU also acts as
a nursing home preadmission screening authority.
In Michigan, staff in the DSS district offices act as case managers,
doing the assessment, authorization, and monitoring of care. There is no
nursing home preadmission screening. The department delegates all
case management work &dquo;in house&dquo; to its local offices. Michigan’s
arrangement lacks a formal &dquo;check and balance&dquo; on the client assessment
process in that the same worker who assesses client need also &dquo;hires&dquo; the
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caregiver. Theoretically (and legally), the client actually employs the
caregiver.
In contrast, the Illinois program separates assessment and delivery
between two distinct agencies, the CCU and the provider. Selection of
the contractor is a matter in which local agencies have the contracts and
have space available. The client and CCU worker are constrained in
their choice of provider by the contracting system.
Determining Need
The local CCU in Illinois determines the number of hours of care a
client needs, that is, care to supplement the amount already being
provided by family or friends. Only care in addition to that being
provided by the informal system can be authorized. This determination
then authorizes the local contract (not-for-profit or proprietary) agency
to begin service delivery. Contract agencies hire employees (usually full
time) to provide direct service. In contrast, the Michigan DSS
caseworker determines the total number of hours of care required and
negotiates a three-way contract with the client and the service provider
to provide actual care. Care already provided by friends or relatives
(except spouses or parents of a minor who are financially responsible) is
compensated, as is any additional service needed.
Hiring Relatives and Friends
In Illinois there is no policy prohibiting the hiring of relatives. A
survey of 76 provider agencies in Illinois conducted in June 1985 found
that 39% of Illinois contract agencies would permit hiring of relatives
under certain circumstances, including situations in which regular
employees are unavailable, an agency employee would have difficulty
meeting particular client needs, or the staff capacity is overextended
(Linsk, Osterbusch et al., in press). The state neither encourages nor
discourages the hiring of relatives, nor would it gain economically by
either policy. The state reimbursement rate, which includes overhead/ super-
vision costs, is the same whether the provider agency hires its own staff
or a relative or friend. Employment of a relative provider is sometimes
recommended by a CCU.
The Michigan DSS, on the other hand, prefers to hire relatives and
friends, and does so directly. About 90% of worker wages are paid to
informal providers rather than to agencies, and about half of these are
relatives of the client. Caseworkers go through agencies &dquo;only in the
more difficult cases&dquo; or when no informal caregivers can be found.
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Agencies command a higher rate of payment, typically $7 per hour
versus approximately $3.65 per hour paid to informal providers. The
state can serve more clients or maximize the amount of time purchased
per client by hiring mostly informal care providers, partly because they
are untrained and only minimally supervised.
To summarize, in Michigan the state exercises program authority,
sets reimbursement on the basis of total client needs without discounting
for care already provided, and systematically encourages paying
informal caregivers. In Illinois the state contracts program authority to
private agencies, discounts for care already provided, and systematically
encourages professional care by relying on formal agencies.
Program Background, Financing,
and Flow of Funds
Centralization of Program Finances
The Illinois Department on Aging (IDOA) is a unified service system
providing an entitlement to all persons over age 60 in need of home care.
Those with incomes above poverty and not Medicaid eligible may also
use the CCP, paying according to a sliding fee scale.
Michigan’s is a means-tested welfare system. Only poor persons are
served and local DSS offices are the main source of available state
assistance. Provisions for noncategorical clients come through the
limited state agency for the aging or private sources. They are
underdeveloped when compared to those in Illinois, as can be seen in the
expenditures (in thousands) and proportions from different funding
sources compared in Table 2. Michigan’s is a bifurcated system of
service for the elderly with priority for categorical services.
Categorical Financing and Its History
By FY85 Michigan used Medicaid financing for fully 75% of the
Adult Home Help program, and 72% of all state-provided home care.
State general funds support 66% of total home care funding between
DSS and the state agency for the aging. In Illinois Medicaid finances
only 29% of the total CCP program, and 85% of the program is
supported with state funds. Michigan’s reliance on categorical Medicaid
funding has apparently stimulated little expansion of services for
income eligibles, whereas the greatly expanded Illinois CCP is available
for all elderly persons, including high-income clients through fees. The
464
Table 2. Home Care Program Costs in FY1985
and Revenue Sources ($ thousands)
a. Counts clients of all ages. Actually 72% of clients are aged.
SOURCE: Michigan Department of Social Services.
b. SOURCE. Illinois Department of Aging.
explanation for these priorities lies in the reasons Medicaid was
included in each program.
Michigan altered its Medicaid program in 1981, when severe
economic pressure threatened the very survival of the Adult Home Help
Program. Previously funded with Title XX, the Home Help program
already had 19,800 categorical clients. By adding personal care as a
benefit to its Medicaid plan, most of the Home Help program clients
became eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, thus sustaining the
program.’ I
Illinois, on the other hand, added Medicaid funding in 1983, when the
state was experiencing growing demand for nursing home beds because
of closure of three state institutions. The courts declared the IDOA CCP
to be an &dquo;entitlement&dquo; and standardized services had to be designed for
statewide delivery, so the IDOA acquired a Medicaid 2176 waiver.2
Thus in Illinois the federal Medicaid match facilitated expansion of
services, while in Michigan it largely supplanted state money.3
Program Utilization and Unit Costs
Program use and annual expenditures in Illinois grew very quickly
after the Community Care Program began in 1979, but especially after
the Medicaid waiver was obtained in 1983 (see Table 3). Use in Michigan
grew much more gradually since Home Help began in the early 1970s
and did not increase with the infusion of Medicaid funding. The Illinois
rapid growth reflects a pattern typical of states receiving Medicaid
waivers in the early 1980s (Linsk, Osterbusch, Keigher, & Simon-
Rusinowitz, 1986) and purchasing care from formal agencies.
465
Table 3. Annual Program Cost and Use
SOURCES: Estimates for Illinois, Department of Aging; for Michigan, Department
of Social Services, Adult Home Help Program. AHH Program use and expenditures
are adjusted here to reflect only the use made by the elderly: 70% of total in FY87,
71 % in FY86, 72% in FY85, and 71 % in FY84.
While average monthly costs appear to be similar in the two states, in
FY86 the maximum allowable payment in Michigan was $333 per
month while in Illinois it was $980 per month. The Michigan maximum
payment was kept just low enough to avoid including worker’s
compensation costs in the payments. The average payment, however,
was about $170. Michigan also has an exception policy for some higher-
cost clients. The Illinois maximum is the cost limit set relative to the cost
of institutional care as required by the home- and community-based
care waiver and the program’s nursing home screening function. While
average clients cost about the same in both states, the basis for this cost
is entirely different.
To summarize, Michigan retained a categorical program tied to the
welfare system to sustain clients, their families, and the state through
difficult economic times by maximizing federal aid through a direct
limit on per client costs. Illinois created an entitlement to service for all
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elderly persons through a more discretionary limit on per client costs
and indirect controls on agency costs, which supports agency interests at
much greater state cost.
Client Impacts
Determination of Eligibility and Functional Assessment
In both states eligibility is determined by meeting guidelines for
income, assets, a physician’s certification of medical need, and a
functional assessment performed by a DSS worker in Michigan and a
CCU contract agency worker in Illinois.
Both states’ eligibility and functional assessment forms weigh the
same factors, but the eligibility criteria start from different basic
assumptions. The Michigan DDS worker asks the client what services
are needed, identifying appropriate individuals in the client’s ecosystem
who can help with each need. Some of these persons are already helping,
and contracting with them is seen simply as a way to assure their
continued involvement. Whether or not services are currently being
provided for free is of little consequence to DDS, and the availability of
informal providers is considered to be an asset. Notes one DSS worker
we interviewed:
Some of the best chore providers are friends who the client found. Many
already are helping anyway. This just formalizes it. Our first approach is
to have the client identify who could be a provider. We feel it works best
when the client already knows the worker. Some take the money
reluctantly, but they take it just the same.
The Home Help payment (or stipend) is seen as a way to keep helpers
in the picture, and to help caregivers purchase what might be necessary
to facilitate appropriate care. The DSS worker draws up a client service
plan, which is reviewed by a nurse in the central office, then negotiates a
contract with the client and the provider (both client and provider
names appear on the monthly reimbursement checks) and monitors the
time sheets submitted monthly by the provider.
In Illinois the CCU, which is reimbursed by the Department of Aging
on a per unit basis, assesses what the client needs that is not currently
being provided. Assessment is directed at &dquo;filling gaps&dquo; and identifying
only currently unmet needs. The CCU authorizes the contract agency to
provide a certain amount of care by deploying its employee, and then
monitors care periodically.
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Basically, then, the Illinois program &dquo;discounts&dquo; for work already
being provided and assumes that it will continue without compensation.
The Michigan program sees this caregiving work as sufficiently vital to
the client to compensate it. The Michigan program stimulates provision
of uncompensated time, simply because a closer bond exists between
informal caregivers and their clients.
Caregiver Consistency and Turnover,
Client Preferences and Efficacy
A 1985 evaluation of the Michigan program provides evidence that
informal caregivers provide clients more regular, consistent, and
reliable care (Michigan Department of Social Services, 1985; Nye,
1985).4 In initiating competitive bidding among contractors, Illinois
stimulated a significant turnover in agency contracts in fiscal years 1984
and 1985, affecting a substantial proportion of the program’s clients.
Stabiliy of the caregiving relation was more assured by the Michigan
program’s contracting with informal caregivers.
Consistent informal care can have shortcomings: It may promote
dependence, may not always be in the best interest of the client (or the
caregiver, who is at risk of burnout), or preclude use of better trained
and consistently productive workers. Yet, formal care providers, hired
to do specific tasks, cannot be permanently depended upon.
Offering the client a choice of provider respects his or her preferences
in general, and may lead to more individualized attention. The
continuity of an agreeable provider further allows the client to assert
preferences in little choices of daily living. Allergies to household
products, food tastes, and preferences in over-the-counter medications,
daily routines, or favorite TV shows might constitute basic reasons an
older person wants to remain at home. These preferences may in fact
reinforce positive behavior and therefore promote activities that
decrease depression and social isolation (Laret, 1980; Pinkston & Linsk,
1984). Knowing these &dquo;reinforcers,&dquo; regular providers can be less intru-
sive and more respectful.
One Michigan DDS worker noted:
There is continuity of care in getting the same person every day, but you
get no such guarantee with a home health agency. With the same person
the client gets security, the same things and the same routines. Some
clients get less paranoid.
In allowing the client and his or her family to select the caregiver, the
client’s preference is paramount, but when a contract agency chooses the
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caregiver, bureaucratic imperatives delimit the choice of client helpers.
Agencies are constrained by formal procedures and legal sanctions; for
example, they &dquo;must not discriminate in any way. If the clients don’t like
it, they go without service.&dquo;5 Home care aides are often assigned at
random without regard to client characteristics. Client preferences are
difficult to honor.
Finally, Michigan workers feel that contracts with informal care
providers enhance client feelings of efficacy, dignity, and reciprocity
with their caregivers. The check written to clients eligible for welfare and
highly dependent on others gives persons some, albeit limited, control
over the care they receive. This control helps preserve personal dignity,
especially when the care is provided by a relative or friend. As another
DSS worker observed:
The client is happy that the helper is getting something for their effort,
some benefit. This allows them a more secure feeling. Also this assures
them that care will continue. The worker is answerable to the state, to
someone else besides the client, so they are expected now to do certain
things.
The client also feels like less of a burden, like they are &dquo;paying their own
way,&dquo; and are less of an imposition on the helper.
The Illinois program requires the client to accept whatever is given
from whomever gives it. The client is relieved of being the &dquo;employer&dquo; of
the provider, but typically is still reliant to some extent on unpaid
informal caregivers, anyway.
Professionalism, Quality Assurance, and Service Linkages
What the Michigan program offers in consistency and client satisfac-
tion, the Illinois program compensates for in professionalism and
appropriateness. In Illinois the professional medical orientation of most
provider agencies assures that medical needs are monitored for a larger
number of clients. Neither program is &dquo;supposed&dquo; to provide medically
oriented care, though both do provide medication monitoring, dressing
changes, exercise, and other medically related care to some extent.
Contract agencies have direct access to medical backup.
Neither state provides much monitoring of quality of care. In Illinois
there are annual client reassessments by the CCU and, of course,
workers are supervised by their agency. The Michigan DSS caseworker
reviews the case within 90 days after eligibility and then every 6 months,
only providing ongoing supervision if a problem arises. The division of
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labor in the Illinois arrangement theoretically provides more quality
assurance.
As the medical needs of the elderly grow in the future, and
increasingly skilled health care intervention is required, the need for
low-skill caregivers will not decrease, but state monitoring staffs are not
likely ever to increase sufficiently to guarantee quality care. The director
of the Michigan program noted in an interview that in 17 years, &dquo;We’ve
never had a major disaster or a scandal in all this time.&dquo; The goodwill
and diligence of a family support network will probably remain the best
oversight upon which a client can rely in the future.
Being separated from the &dquo;aging network&dquo; of the state aging agency,
the Michigan program limits client access to knowledge of other
services. On this dimension the Illinois program seems stronger,
although oversight by the case managers as well as networking are
significantly limited by large caseloads and narrowness of functions.
Respite for Informal Caregivers
Neither state funds respite care of informal caregivers directly,
although both home care services facilitate it. While Michigan allows
paid informal caregivers to spend the money received as they choose, the
actual number of hours provided are only loosely accounted for, and
caregivers are free to &dquo;subcontract&dquo; care in order to get time off. This
flexibility is more difficult to arrange in Illinois, since the agency worker
is not to substitute for the care informal caregivers already provide. In
providing direct care for the client, however, the CCP does allow the
informal caregiver time off also.
To summarize, the differences in client impacts include the implica-
tions of the state’s practices of using professional versus nonprofessional
caregivers, &dquo;discounting&dquo; of informal caregiver time and effort, con-
sistency of care, tendency to support and honor the client’s preferences,
support of client control, extent of external monitoring, and extent of
caregiver respite.
Discussion and Implications
This examination has shown that a state’s choice to reimburse formal
as opposed to informal caregivers has powerful implications for client
care and that it creates further incentives for the administering agencies.
While both agencies and informal caregivers have proven to be effective
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paid providers, neither care delivery strategy is unequivocally &dquo;better&dquo;
for states or clients. Each has its strengths.
In the policy development stage in both states there was heated
debate about the &dquo;morality&dquo; of paying family members to do what is
perceived by some as &dquo;already their duty.&dquo; Interestingly, this question
received little attention after a choice was made. In Michigan one DSS
Adult Services social worker noted in an interview:
Back in 1969 there was a lot of controversy about paying parents or
relatives. Now we just take it for granted. There is no question about it
[now], that’s the rule.
Indeed, questions of &dquo;who to reimburse for what&dquo; are heavily value-
laden, not simple issues of efficiency or even effectiveness. Policy
decisions made on the basis of political pressures or assumptions about
the services of a network of agencies are rationalized as a response to
client needs. Yet what is truly best for elderly persons and their support
systems is not easily discovered in systems that are overly proscribed.
Client needs can be easily obscured by suggestions of &dquo;immorality&dquo; in
paying families. And once precedents are set, state policies gain a
directional momentum.
As increasing numbers of families acquire an interest in home care,
making it a highly charged issue, community-based and posthospital
services grow and home care agencies are emerging as a significant
political force in the state houses. The formal home care industry that
has developed rapidly in Illinois now has a vital stake in future
discussions of family involvement. If poor families are to remain an
acknowledged part of client support systems, rather than simply a lower
cost alternative to agencies, they will probably need a lobbying capacity,
too. The formal care system has developed in lieu of a system that could
have reimbursed informal caregivers-an alternative that Michigan’s
experience indicates is still a reasonable one for serving a significant
portion of poor elderly clients.
Medically oriented provider organizations typically strive to maintain
their discretion, generating revenue, operating efficiently, and (especially
in highly competitive markets) satisfying their consumers. While hiring
informal caregivers might enhance patient satisfaction, this alternative
can be accepted by an industry only if its survival is assured first. The
home health industry in Illinois now lobbies toward that end.
No such organized lobby has developed in Michigan, where the state
Home Help beneficiaries are low-income citizens receiving small grants
(and home health agencies serve mainly non-Medicaid clients). These
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individuals are not organized, and could not be organized easily. Low-
income, elderly, frail, and disabled clients and their caregivers (children
and friends) have little basis for even knowing each other, much less
organizing. The interests of the Home Help family caregivers are
disparate and not strong ones for lobbying. Advocacy groups, such as
the Alzheimer’s and Related Disorders Association, nursing home
reform groups, and professional societies only recently have begun to
focus public attention on informal care.
Professional bias, organizational imperatives, and political pressures
all too often shape policymakers’ perceptions of family and informal
care, encouraging reimbursement incentives that either exploit informal
caregivers or undervalue them. Professionals and government employees
(who are, one hopes, insulated from interest group bias) should be
sensitive to appropriate informal caregiving, dispassionately weigh the
strengths and weaknesses of reimbursing informal caregivers, and
advocate for consideration of this policy option.
For example, in Illinois, where state workers have little discretion at
the direct service level, policy and organizational changes are still
possible. The state could adopt policy guidelines for contract agencies
about when to &dquo;hire&dquo; informal caregivers, or the CCU could arrange
care directly with informal caregivers in concert with client choice,
bypassing the contract agency. Sending in an agency &dquo;stranger&dquo; could,
indeed, be made the option of last resort, rather than the first choice. In
Michigan more options, orientation, and training opportunities could
be offered to paid informal caregivers. DSS could encourage develop-
ment of special purpose agencies, cooperatives, and respite care. The
alternatives suggested by each of these states are worth consideration by
the other, in order to expand the choices open to clients and those who
care for them.
The development of the Michigan and Illinois programs show how
home care program structure and financing can incrementally become
two distinct models of service delivery, one client-centered and one
agency-centered, with very different implications for clients. While this
analysis could not, of course, account for variation in practices
throughout each state, evidence has highlighted the implicit values and
impacts of client policies.
Under American laissez-faire federalism, values and precedents that
are quickly reified into a program in one state are sometimes thoroughly
overlooked by a neighboring state.6 Since policymakers can be persuaded
by good experience as well as by political pressure, we believe more
attention to client and caregiver satisfaction would serve to make
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payment to informal caregivers a more widely acknowledged policy
option.
Notes
1. To avoid the Medicaid prohibition on provision of personal care by relatives, the
state narrowed its definition of family to include only relatives who were financially
responsible, thus allowing most relatives caring for the elderly (about half of all Home
Help providers) to continue to be eligible for Home Help payments.
2. Section 2176 of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act authorized waivers for
home- and community-based care to states that could show that this would not increase
overall Medicaid expenditures. Illinois has such a waiver to provide services to the aged;
Michigan does not.
3. Michigan’s choice to use a regular Medicaid service (personal care) rather than a
waiver may have precluded the close scrutiny by the federal Health Care Finance
Administration that Illinois and other waiver states have since experienced. Michigan
complies with the Medicaid requirement for nurse supervision of personal care by having a
nurse in the central state office do a "paper review." This can be variously perceived as an
administrative efficiency (DSS avoids significant state quality assurance costs) or a
weakness (lack of federal oversight permits poor care).
4. These two evaluations, four years apart, showed that the mean age for clients and
caregivers had each increased by four years. (This may also be evidence that few new
[younger] clients are being admitted to the program.) Increasingly, caregivers tend to
coreside with the clients.
5. Interview with staff of a Michigan home care agency, October 1986.
6. While the evidence presented in this study may seem subjective, it has yielded salient
questions about client benefits in the two states. In qualitative research such exploration
has been called "perspectival." For a description of such generative methods and their
value, see Lincoln (1986), and for their value to aging research, see Borgatta and
Montgomery (1987).
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